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COMMENTS
STATE WAGE COLLECTION LAWS:
SUPPLEMENTING TIRE BANKRUPTCY ACT
The general problem to be considered here is that of the employer's
insolvency and consequent inability to pay wages which have already
been earned. More specifically this comment examines the various
types of state legislation designed to assist employees in the collection
of these earned but unpaid wages, with primary consideration directed
to those statutes which enable the employee to circumvent the limita-
tions of the federal Bankruptcy Act. State wage priority statutes are
therefore not included,' nor are general creditor collection devices,
criminal sanctions against non-payment of wages,2 and laws authorizing
the assignment of wage claims to an administrative agency for collec-
tion.3
The Bankruptcy Act provides one method of collecting unpaid
wages, but this remedy is frequently inadequate from the employee's
standpoint because of the limitations imposed by the act. These limita-
tions, though necessary for the protection of other classes of creditors,
can, in many cases, mean the loss of earned wages if the employee has
no remedy other than his claim in the bankruptcy proceedings. The
major limitation is the size of the distributable bankruptcy estate."
Wage claims, like the claims of other unsecured creditors, can be paid
only from assets remaining after secured creditors and lienors have
realized on their security.5 If the employer's property was heavily
mortgaged or subject to large tax liens there may be nothing left for
unsecured creditors.
1 In bankruptcy proceedings state priority statutes are superseded by the priorities
of the Bankruptcy Act. In re Inland Dredging Corp., 61 F2d 765 (2d Cir. 1932),
cert. denied 288 U.S. 611. Washington has established the same priorities as the
federal Bankruptcy Act in state proceedings for dissolution of a corporation. REV.
CODE WASH. § 23.01.610 (1961). For assignments for the benefit of creditors and
insolvency proceedings the priority for wages is limited to $100 for services rendered
within sixty days prior to the assignment or institution of proceedings. REV. CODE
WASH. § 49.56.010 (1961). The same priority exists when another creditor seeks to
collect by "execution, attachment and similar writs." REV. CODE WASH. § 49.56.030
(1961).
2 In Washington, wrongful refusal to pay wages by one having ability to pay is a
misdemeanor. REV. CODE WASH. § 49.48.060 (1961).5 E.g., REV. CODE WASH. § 49.48.040 (1961).
4 In fiscal 1961, nationally, no distribution was made to creditors in 892% of the
straight bankruptcy cases. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS 4 (1961). In the state of Washington no distri-
bution was made in 86.9% of the cases. Id. Table F 4a.
5 9 Am. JuR. 2d Bankruptcy § 955 (1963).
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Any assets remaining after the secured creditors take their security
are applied first to the payment of the costs and expenses of administra-
tion of the bankruptcy estate and then to the satisfaction of wage
claims.' The costs and expenses of administration include the costs of
preserving the bankruptcy estate, fees for the referee's salary and ex-
pense fund, filing fees if paid by someone other than the bankrupt, costs
of recovering property transferred or concealed by the bankrupt, the
trustee's expenses in opposing the bankrupt's discharge, fees and mile-
age payable to witnesses, attorneys' fees of the bankrupt and of
creditors petitioning for involuntary bankruptcy, and in some cases
attorneys' expenses for such items as accountants and appraisers.'
These expenses can consume a sizeable portion, if not all, of the dis-
tributable assets.'
After secured creditors and expenses of bankruptcy administration,
wage claims are paid from any remaining assets to the extent of $600
per claimant if the wages were earned within three months prior to
bankruptcy.' Only workmen, servants, clerks, or traveling or city
salemen are entitled to the priority. This has been held to exclude
executives,"1 officers,12 managers,' purchasing agents,' 4 foremen, 5
superintendents, and supervisors" of the bankrupt business. Even if
the employee is within the priority class, $600 by our modern infla-
tionary standards may be less than the monthly paycheck. Any part
o Bankruptcy Act § 64, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1953).
7 Bankruptcy Act § 64 (a)(1), 11 U.S.C. § 104 (a)(1) (1953).8 In fiscal 1961, in the 10.8% of the straight bankruptcy cases in which assets were
distributed to creditors (see note 4 supra), expenses of administration consumed 25.8%
of the total assets. BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS, op. cit. mipra note 4 at 10.0 In fiscal 1960, the last year for which a detailed analysis of distribution is avail-
able, in only 12A% of the straight bankruptcy cases were any assets distributed to
creditors. ADrnNIsRAIv OFCE OF THE UxnIED STATES COURTs, TABLES OF BANK-
RupTcY STATISTICS 4 (1960). The percentage distribution of these assets is as
follows: secured creditors, 30.5%; administrative expenses, 25.5%; unsecured credi-
tors, 23.8%; tax claims having priority under § 64(a)(4), 11.7%; wage claims having
priority under § 64(a)(2), 2.1%; other priorities, 1.7%; other payments, 4.7%. Id. at
10. However, these statistics are for all straight bankruptcies. The problems examined
in this comment relates only to btsiness bankruptcies. Since business bankruptcies
accounted for only 11.2% of all bankruptcies in 1960, id. at 3, the above statistics can
only be considered as giving a very general indication of the disposition of assets in
business bankruptcies.
10 Bankruptcy Act § 64(a) (2), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (2) (1953).
"1In re Marshall E. Smith & Bro., 35 F. Supp. 56 (E.D. Pa. 1940) ; In re Goldman
Stores, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 936 (W.D. La. 1933).
12 It re Pacific Oil & Meal Co., 24 F. Supp. 767 (S.D. Cal. 1938).
1Blsigv. Blanchard, 223 Fed. 35 (9th Cir. 1915).
'
4 li re Goldman Stores, 3 F. Supp. 936 (W.D. La. 1933).
'.5 In re Bush Terminal Printing Corp., 32 F2d 264 (E.D.N.Y. 1929), aff'd inern.,
32 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1929); it- re Broudarge Bros. Novelty Yam, 22 F. Supp. 891
(E.D.N.Y. 1938).
'6 Wintermote v. MacLafferty, 233 Fed. 95 (9th Cir. 1916).
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of a claim over $600 has the same status as the claims of general un-
secured creditors' and in most cases is worth, if anything at all, only a
few cents on the dollar.
State legislation which either by design or coincidence gives the em-
ployee a remedy supplemental to the Bankruptcy Act has taken two
basic forms: preventive and remedial. In the first group are bonding
laws and laws which regulate the payment of wages and upon violation
give the employee the right to collect an additional amount of civil
penalty or liquidated damages.' In the second group are statutory
labor liens and stockholder liability laws.
BONDING LAWS
With two exceptions, 9 bonding laws, much like statutory labor liens,
apply only to specific industries. These industries are selected for leg-
islative assistance presumably because of a stronger need due either to
frequent management abuses or, more likely, to frequent business
insolvencies. The basic purpose of a bonding law is to compel the
employer to provide in advance a fund, beyond the control of the
employer, which can be used for the payment of wages if ever the
employer refuses to pay or becomes unable to do so himself. Labor
unions, recognizing the utility in such an approach, have at the bargain-
ing table sought to include provisions in union contracts for a wage bond
by the employer, but such attempts have been frustrated by a National
Labor Relations Board ruling that such bonds are not a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations
Act.'" Thus any relief under a bonding approach must come from the
legislature.
The most common type of bonding law is that applying to public
works contractors. While one of the purposes of such legislation is to
protect the public interest in the event of the contractor's default,2
thirty-four states" require that the bond also be conditioned upon the
"7 In re Ko-Ed Tavern, 129 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1942).
18 Laws providing for a civil penalty or liquidated damages could properly be
classed as remedial, but the preventive aspect of such laws is of greater import for
the purposes of this discussion. See text following note 72 infra.
10 See text accompanying notes 37 and 38 infra.
20 Carpenters' Dist. Council, 145 NLRB No. 64 (1963) (three to two decision).
See Local 164, Brotherhood of Painters v. NLRB, 293 F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir. 1961),
cert. denied 368 U.S. 822; Cf. NLRB v. Dalton Telephone Co., 187 F.2d 811 (5th Cir.
1951), cert. denied 342 U.S. 824.
2143 Am. JUR. Public Works and Contracts §§ 137, 144 (1942).
22 ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-604 (1956), 51-632 (1963 Supp.); CAL. Gov't CODE §§
4200-4208; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-41 (1960) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 6911
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payment of employees' wages.23 Two states require a bond only for
highway construction contracts " and fifteen states require one only if
the contract price exceeds a specified amount.25
Eleven states" extend bonding laws to other industries. Industries
selected for protection include: mining, 7 railroad construction, well
drilling," manufacturing,"0 mineral refining,2 farm labor contractors,
(1953); D.C. CODE § 1-804 (1961); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 255.05 (1962); IDAHO CODE§ 45-502 (1948); Smith-Hurd ILL. STAT. ANo. ch. 29, § 15 (1935); BURN's IND.
STAT. ANN. § 53-201 (1951); IOWA CODE ANN. § 573.6 (1950); KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 68-410 (1950); LA. REV. STAT. § 38:2241 (1951); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN.
ch. 149, § 29 (1957); MIcH. ComP. LAWS § 570101 (1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
57426 (1947); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 6-404 (1957); NEB. RV. STAT. § 52-118(1960); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. 447:16 (1955); N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 137 (1940);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 48-01-01 (1960); OIlO REV. CODE ANN. § 153.54 (1953); OxLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 1 (1963); ORE. RFV. STAT. § 279.510 (1963); PURnON'S PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2267; tit. 53, §§ 36907, 46319, 56804, 65803 (1959); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 37-12-1 (1957); S.C. CODE § 33-224 (1962); TENN. CODE ANN. § 12-417(1955); VmRNON'S TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. § 5160 (1962); UTAH CODE ANN. §
14-1-5 (1962); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 4(14) (1959); VA. CODE ANN. § 11-20(1964); REv. CODE WASH. §§ 39.08.010, 60.28.010 (1961); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3760
(1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 289.16(1) (1958).2 3 What constitutes wages can also be an issue under such statutes. Bernard v.
Indemnity Ins. Co. of No. Am., 162 Cal. App. 2d 479, 329 P.2d 57 (1958), held
that a public works contractor's bond to secure payment "for any work or labor" was
liable for unpaid obligations to a union welfare fund.24 South Carolina and Vermont, note 22 supra.
25 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-632 (1963 Supp.); statutes for the following additional
states are cited note 22 supra: California, Connecticut, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Virginia, Wisconsin. Minimum contract prices range from $200 in Idaho
to $10,000 in New Hampshire and South Carolina.
26 California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Montana, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Texas, Washington. Statutes are cited at notes 27 and 32-38 infra.
27 CAL.. LABOR CODE §§ 270, 272, held constitutional in Ephraim v. Jamestown Judicial
Dist. Court, 120 Cal. App.2d 741, 262 P.2d 56 (1953); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 80-15 to
-4, 80-25-3, 92-11-8 to -10 (1953) ; SMITH-Hun ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 48, §§ 39f-1 to
-5 (1950); BuRN's IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-112 to -115 (1952), applied in Bell v.
State, 217 Ind. 323, 27 N.E2d 362 (1940); MONT. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 41-1315 to
-1317 (1961) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45, ch. 1, §§ 305-310 (1954) ; UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 34-10-17 to -20 (1953).
28 CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 16-92 (1960); ME. REv. STAT. ch. 45, § 48 (1954),
applied in Blanchard v. Portland & R.F. Ry., 87 Me. 241, 32 Atl. 890 (1895), Palangio
v. Wild River Lbr. Co., 86 Me. 315, 29 At. 1087 (1894) and Rogers v. Dexter &
P.R-R., 85 Me. 372, 27 At. 257 (1893); REv. CODE WASH. § 60.04.010 (1959), applied
in Cloud v. Greenwood Logging Co., 157 Wash. 261, 288 Pac. 910 (1930); Dixon
v. Parker, 102 Wash. 101, 172 Pac. 856 (1918); Clarke v. Murphy, 99 Wash. 643,
170 Pac. 141 (1918); E.I. DuPont De Nemours Powder Co. v. National Sur.. Co.,
94 Wash. 461, 162 Pac. 866 (1917) ; Laidlaw v. Portland, V. & Y. R.R., 42 Wash. 292,
84 Pac. 855 (1906). These statutes require the railroad to take a bond from its
construction contractors or be liable for their labor debts. While the amount of the
bond is discretionary, it would presumably in practice be based on the size of the
payroll.29 Illinois, Indiana, Montana. Statutes cited note 27 supra.
3o Illinois, Indiana. Statutes cited note 27 supra.
31 Colorado, Montana. Statutes cited note 27 supra.
32 CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1684(c), 1693; Rxv. CODE WASH. § 19.30.040 (1961) (bond
is discretionary with the director of the department of labor and industries).
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logging," theatrical enterprises,34 stevedoring contractors," and private
construction contractors." Two states have laws of more general ap-
plication. In Oregon every employer is subject to a bonding require-
ment after an initial default in the payment of wages.3 Wyoming re-
quires a bond of every non-resident employer doing business within the
state less than five years, unless he owns $5,000 worth of realty within
the state which is subject to execution.3
The statutes affecting selected industries, other than public works
contractors, are often so limited as to be of restricted application even
in the selected industry. A common type of limitation is the require-
ment of a bond only when the operator of the business is a lessee of the
business premises,8 or when he has anything less than an unencumbered
fee simple title to the premises,4" or when he owns unencumbered real
property located anywhere within the state of value less than a specified
amount. 1 Under some statutes there is an additional limitation that the
employer need post a bond only after an initial default in wages.43 How-
ever, nearly one half of the statutes require a bond of every employer in
the specified industry.4
Some statutes permit in lieu of the bond a bank deposit,44 a deposit
3 CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 270.5, 272.
84 CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 271,272.
35 VERNON TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5191-5195 (1962).
38 REV. CODE WASH. §§ 18.27.010-.100 (1964 Supp.).
37 ORE. REV. STAT. § 652.340 (1963).
38WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-6, -7 (1959).
89 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 92-11-8 to -10 (1953) (coal mines).
40 CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 270, 272 (mining) ; CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 271-272 (theatrical
enterprises) ; COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 80-15-1 to -4, 80-25-3 (1953) (mining and mineral
refining). MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 41-1315 to -1317 (1961) (mining, mineral re-
fining and well drilling) requires only half ownership of an unencumbered fee to
qualify for the exemption. SMITH-HURD ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 48 §§ 39f-1 to -5 (1952)
and BURN'S IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-112 to -115 (1952) (mining, well drilling and
manufacturing) exempt all but lessees, bailees and conditional buyers and even these
are exempt if the value of their real and personal property within the state exceeds
the amount of the bond.
41 CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 270.5, 272 (logging) ; Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-6, -7 (1959)
(non-resident employers).
42 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 80-15-1 to -4, 92-11-8 to -10 (1953) (mining and mineral
refining); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 41-1315 to -1317 (1961) (mining and well
drilling) ; ORE. REV. STAT. § 652.340 (1963) (any employer).
43 CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1684, 1693 (farm labor contractors); CONN. GEN. STAT.
REV. § 16-92 (1962) (railroad construction); ME. REV. STAT. ch. 45, § 48 (1954)
(railroad construction); OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45, ch. 1, §§ 305-310 (1954) (coal
mining) ; VERNON'S TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5191-5195 (1962) (stevedoring
contractors); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-10-17 to -20 (1953) (mining) ; REV. CODE
WASH. § 60.04.010 (1961) (railroad construction); REv. CODE WASH. §§ 1827.010-.100
(Supp. 1964) (private construction contractors).
44 CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 270.5, 272 (logging). CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 270, 271-272(mining and theatrical enterprises) and CoLo. REV. STAT. § 80-25-3 (1953) (mining)
apparently do not permit a bond but require a bank deposit instead.
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with an administrative agency of cash or negotiable securities, 5 an as-
signment of accounts receivable,4 or proof of ability to pay a specified
amount.' The method of fixing the amount of the bond varies from
the stipulation of a flat sum'8 to a sum based on the number of em-
ployees 5 or on the average payroll." Only Utah allows a majority of
the employees to waive the bonding requirement."'
Most of the statutes make failure to provide the bond of misde-
meanor5 2 and several authorize an injunction against continuing busi-
ness until the bond is furnished.5"
4GREv. CODE WASH. §§ 18.27.010-.100 (Supp. 1964) (private construction con-
tractors).
46 CoLO. REV. STAT. § 80-25-3 (1953) (mining).
47UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-10-17 to -20 (1953) (mining).
48 CA.. LABOR CODE §§ 1684, 1693 (farm labor contractors: $1,000); VERNON'S
TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5191-5195 (1962) (stevedoring contractors: $5,000) ;
REv. CODE WASH. §§ 1827.010-.100 (Supp. 1964) ("general" private construction
contractors: $2,000; "specialty" private construction contractors: $1,000); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. §§ 27-6, -7 (1959) (non-resident employers: $1,000).
49 CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 80-15-1 to -4 (1953) (mining: $500 for each unit of five
employees or less) ; COLO. Rzv. STAT. §§ 92-11-8 to -10 (1953) (coal mining: $1,000
for each unit of ten men or less, in addition to bond for all types of mining, but
not more than $5,000) ; MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 41-1315 to -1317 (1961) (mining:
$500 for each unit of five employees or less); OrA.. STAT. ANN. tit 45, ch. 1, §§
305-310 (1954) (coal mining: sliding scale ranging from $1,500 for three to twelve
employees to $15,000 for 300 or more).
GO CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 270, 271-72 (mining and theatrical enterprises: before
starting work in any pay period an amount sufficient to meet the payroll for that
period must be on deposit in a bank in the county where the work is performed) ;
CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 270.5, 272 and 8 CAL. ADm. CODE § 13300 (logging: bond equal
to highest contemplated semi-monthly payroll for coming year plus 10%, but not
less than highest semi-monthly payroll for past year); COLO. REv. STAT. § 80-25-3
(153) (mining: before starting work in any pay period an amount sufficient to meet
the payroll for that period must be on deposit in a bank in the county where the
work is performed) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 16-92 (1960) (railroad construction:
discretionary with the railroad, see note 28 vipra; SmiTH-HuRD ILL. STAT. ANN. ch.
48, §§ 39f-1 to -5 (1950) (mining, well drilling and manufacturing: double the semi-
monthly or weekly payroll); BuRN's IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-112 to -115 (1952)
(mining, well drilling and manufacturing: double the weekly payroll); ME. REv.
STAT. ch. 45, § 48 (1954) (railroad construction: discretionary with the railroad, see
note 28 supra) ; ORE. RE. STAT. § 652.340 (1963) (every employer: discretionary
with the commissioner of labor, subject to summary judicial review); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 37-10-17 to -20 (1953) (mining: double the largest monthly payroll);
REv. CODE WASH. § 60.04.010 (1961) (railroad construction: discretionary with the
railroad, see note 28 supra.)
r
5 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 37-10-17 to -20 (1953).52 CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 270-72 (mining, logging and theatrical enterprises) ; CAL.
LABOR CODE §§ 1684, 1693 (farm labor contractors); CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 92-11-8
to -10 (1953) (coal mining); SMITH-HuRD ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 48 §§ 39f-1 to -5
(1950) (mining, well drilling and manufacturing); BuRN's IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-112
to -115 (1953) (mining, well drilling and manufacturing) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45,
ch. 1, §§ 305-10 (1954) (coal mining); VERNONS TEX R v. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts
5191-195 (1962) (stevedoring contractors); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 37-10-17 to -20(1953) (mining); Rv. CODE WASH. § 1827.020 (Supp. 1964) (private construction
contractors).
53 COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 80-15-1 to -4 (1953) (mining and mineral refining) ; MONT.
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 41-1315 to -1317 (1961) (mining, mineral refining and well
19651
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Washington's statute," making the bonding of private construction
contractors mandatory, is apparently the only one of its kind, although
this type of legislation was first recommended in the law reviews in
1958. " The statute is designed to eliminate some of the problems of the
traditional mechanics' and materialmen's lien. A major drawback of
such liens56 is the frequent injustice to the owner of the property under
construction. Typically, the owner of the premises contracts for the
construction or remodeling of a building on his land and pays the con-
struction contractor stipulated increments of the contract price as the
work progresses. In theory the progressive payments are intended to
defray the costs of labor and materials as the work progresses. How-
ever, if the contractor has underestimated his costs or is financially
pressed elsewhere, the owner may suddenly find himself faced with an
uncompleted building, a bankrupt contractor and liens against his
property for the contractor's defaulted wages and materials. There-
fore, the owner must in effect pay twice for that part of the project
which was completed-once to the contractor and again to the con-
tractor's workers and suppliers.
One solution which has been attempted in several states57 with little
success,58 is a statutory provision giving the owner the option of requir-
ing a bond from the contractor. If a bond is provided the owner is
exempt from mechanics' and materialmen's liens. However, in practice
the bond generally is required only by the owners of large construction
projects. The small entrepreneur and the homeowner apparently either
do not know of the option or do not realize the value of releasing the
drilling); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45, ch. 1, §§ 305-10 (1954) (coal mining) ; ORE.
REV. STAT. § 652.340 (1963) (every employer); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 37-10-17 to -20
(1953) (mining).
5 REv. CODE WASH. §§ 18.27.010-.100 (Supp. 1964). The statute was held in vio-
lation of WASH. CONST. art. 2, § 19 in Treffry v. Taylor, No. 171271, Spokane County
Super. Court, March 24, 1964, because the title of the act referred only to "registra-
tion," and the subject of the act was "regulation." An appeal is pending.
55 Comment, Mechanics' Liens and Surety Bonds in the Building Trades, 68 YALE
L.J. 138 (1958) ; Comment, The Florida Mechanics' Lien Act: Interpretation and
Analysis of Selected Provisions, 14 U. MIAMI L. REV. 73 (1959). Other legislatures
have also considered such legislation. Illinois Legislative Council, Mechanics' Lien
Laws, Sept. 13, 1962 (unpublished memorandum on microcard in University of Wash-
ington Law School Library).
56 The reader is referred to the law review comments cited supra note 55 for more
detailed analysis and discussion.
57 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1185.1 (C) (1955) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 84.231 (1964);
N.Y. LIEN LAW § 37; VERNON'S TEX. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 5472d (1962). The pro-
vision was also included in UNIFORM MECHANICS' LIEN AcT § 7 (1932), enacted only
in Florida, which has since repealed the uniform act but retained the option provision.
The Uniform Act is no longer being recommended by its promulgators.
58 Comment, Mechanics' Liens and Surety Bonds in; the Building Trades, supra
note 55; Comment, The Florida Mechanics' Lien Act, supra note 55.
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lien. Another factor is the cost of the bond, which is, of course, passed
on to the owner in the contract price.59 The mandatory requirement of
the Washington act, should eliminate the problems of optional bonding.
Not only does the Washington act give better protection to the owner,
it also better enables the workers and suppliers to collect on their
claims."0 The simple enforcement procedure against the bond"' stands
in marked contrast to the technical, expensive and time-consuming
requirements of notice, filing and foreclosure under the lien law. 2
The bonding approach to the general wage collection problem has in
its favor the fact that a fund for the payment of wages is created, which
is unaffected by the employer's insolvency or by bankruptcy proceed-
ings. One disadvantage is that it offers protection only to workers in the
selected industries. As mentioned earlier, Oregon applies the bonding
concept to every employer, but only after an initial default. This ap-
proach appears effective and reasonable if the employer desires to con-
tinue in business, 3 but if the first default is in connection with the
employer's bankruptcy it is like locking the barn door after the horse is
out. Since it is obviously expensive and impractical to require initially
a bond of every employer, the application of the bonding approach to
the basic wage collection problem is essentially limited to expansion to
additional industries as the legislature sees a need arise.64 The draw-
back is that the usually sluggish legislative response may result in no
relief or tardy relief for employees in the affected industry.
CIVIL PENALTY LAWS
These laws" generally provide that when an employer fails to pay
wages statutorily due, he becomes liable to the employee for an addi-
59 Ibid.60 A study of 33,000 mechanics' and materialmen's liens filed against private im-
provements in the greater New York City area over a six-year period showed that
each year less than one-half of the liens were satisfied. BROOKE, OTHER PEoPLEdS
LABOR AND MATERIAL IN THE BUILDING INDUSTRY OF GREATER NEW YORK (1933),
cited in Comment, Mechanics' Liens and Surety Bonds in the Building Trades, stpra
note 55, at 168, n.150.61 Suit may be filed upon the bond in the superior court of the county in which the
work was done or in any county where jurisdiction over the employer may be had.
REv. CODE WASH. § 18.27.040 (Supp. 1964).
62 REV. CODE WASH. §§ 60.04.020, .060, .120 (1961).
63The statute expressly provides the employer with recourse to the courts from the
decision of the commissioner of labor to require a bond, at which time the employer
may challenge the amount of the bond, whether there is just cause for requiring the
bond and whether the bond is reasonably necessary or appropriate to secure the
prompt payment of wages. Oa. REv. STAT. § 652.340 (1963).64 California appears to be following this approach. It first applied bonding to
public works contractors (1919), and then to mining (1933), theatrical enterprises
(1941) and logging (1957).
65 These laws generally appear to be patterned after a model act drafted by a
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tional sum of money. Some statutes denominate the sum a "civil pen-
alty" 8 while others call it "liquidated damages.""3 7 The name should
make no difference 8 unless a court is inclined to apply the rule that
statutes providing for a penalty should be strictly construed. 9
The statutes may be classified into three groups: (1) those which
provide a penalty only if an employee is discharged and is not paid,0
(2) those which provide a penalty only if the employee is either dis-
charged or quits and is not paid,7' and (3) those which provide a pen-
alty whenever an employee is not paid.72 While the purpose of the first
committee of state labor commissioners appointed in 1936 by the Secretary of Labor.
The act has been recommended by the Third National Conference on Labor Legis-
lation and the International Association of Governmental Labor Officials. The act
may be found in UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, DIvIsION OF LABOR STAND-
ARDS, WAGE PAYMENT AND WAGE COLLECTION LAWS, Bulletin No. 58 (1943). Twenty-
two states have enacted such laws. See statutes cited notes 70 to 72 infra.(6 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-308 (1960); CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 201-203; IDAHO CODE
§§ 45-606, -607 (1947); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-301, -302 (1949); LA. REV.
STAT. §§ 23:631-632 (1950); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 181.13-.17 (1945); VERNON'S
Mo. STAT. ANN. §§ 290.110-.120 (1949); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 41-1301 to -1306
(1961); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 608.010-.060 (1957); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-3-1 to -4
(1960); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 652.140-.150 (1953); S.C. CODE §§ 40-111, -112, -117,
-118 (1962) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2356 (1961).
867 D.C. CODE §§ 36-601 to -610 (1961); SMITH-HuRD ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 48, §§
39h, i (1961); BURN'S IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-101 to -105 (1952); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 82.112 (1946); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 275:42-:45 (1963 Supp.); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40, ch. 5, §§ 165.1, .3, .4 (1951) ; PUlDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 260.10
(1963 Supp.).
8s See e.g., Leep v. St. Louis I.M. & S. Ry., 58 Ark. 407, 25 S.W. 75 (1894);
Livingston v. Susquehanna Oil Co., 113 Kan. 702, 216 Pac. 296 (1923).
89 50 Am. JUR. Statutes §§ 407, 408 (1944). E.g. Deardorf v. Hunter, 160 La. 213,
106 So. 831 (1926); Monterosso v. St. Louis Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 368
S.W.2d 481 (Mo. 1963), cert. denied 375 U.S. 908 (1964).
70 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-308 (1960); IDAHO CODE §§ 45-606, -607 (1947); VaR-
NON'S MO. STAT. ANN. §§ 290-110-120 (1949); N.M., STAT. ANN. §§ 59-3-1 to -4
(1960); S.C. CODE §§ 40-111. -112, -117, -118 (1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2356
(1961). A Utah statute in this group, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-10-2, -6 (1953), was
declared unconstitutional in Justice v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 12 Utah 2d 357, 366
P.2d 974 (1961), because of the "arbitrary" exclusion from the act of banks and
mercantile houses. An earlier case had sustained the constitutionality of the act
against an attack on the same grounds. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah
523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941).
71 CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 201-203; D.C. CODE §§ 36-601 to -610 (1961) ; SMITH-HuRD
ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 48, §§ 39h, i (1961); LA. REv. STAT. §§ 23:631-632 (1950);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 181.13-.17 (1945) ; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 275:42-:45 (1963
Supp.) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, ch. 5, §§ 165.1, .3, A (1951) ; ORE. REv. STAT. §§
652.140-.150 (1953).
72 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-10-1 to -8 (1953); BuRN's IND. STAT. ANN. §§
40-101 to -105 (1952); IOWA CODE ANN. § 82.112 (1946); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 44-301, -302 (1949) ; MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 41-1301 to -1306 (1961) ; NEv.
REV. STAT. §§ 608.010 -.060 (1957) ; PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 260.10 (1963
Supp.) ; Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 103.30 (1957). Statutes of Michigan and Texas in this
group have been declared unconstitutional on the grounds of being special legislation
and working a deprivation of property without due process of law. MicH. ComP.
LAWS §§ 408.541, .543 (1948); Davidow v. Wadsworth Mfg. Co., 211 Mich. 90, 178
N.W. 776 (1920); VERNON'S TEX. RFv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6431 (1925); San
Antonio & A.P. Ry. v. Wilson, 19 S.W. 910 (Tex. Civ. App. 1892); Missouri, K. & T.
Ry. v. Braddy, 135 S.W. 1059 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911). The Michigan statute applied
to various selected industries. The Texas statute applied only to railroads. The con-
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two types of statutes is dearly remedial, the third group has an addi-
tional purpose which is more important for the purposes of this discus-
sion, namely the deterrent effect against delaying the payment of
wages."
The theory of the deterrent effect is that a financially hard-pressed
employer, faced with the choice of paying wages or paying other cred-
itors, will be more likely to choose the former if the failure to pay
wages would incur economic penalties. This deterrent will only be
effective if the employer has hopes of surviving his financial crisis with-
out bankruptcy. If bankruptcy is declared, civil penalty laws are of no
avail to the employees unless there are sufficient assets in the bank-
ruptcy estate to make distribution of share to unsecured creditors, since
a penalty or liquidated damages presumably would not qualify as
"wages" for the purpose of the bankruptcy priority.
The statutes generally apply to all employers in the state; however,
Iowa's 4 applies only to coal mines and Colorado's only to corpora-
tions.7 5 Indiana and South Carolina' each apply different penalties to
two classes of employers. 7 Several states exempt certain employers
from the operation of the act, e.g., federal,7 state and local govern-
ments,7 farm labor employers, ° employers of domestic help,8' hos-
stitutionality of other statutes has been expressly upheld. Leep v. St Louis I. M. &
S.R.R., 58 Ark. 407, 25 S.W. 75 (1894); Davis v. Morris, 37 Cal.App. 2d 269. 99
P.2d 345 (1940); Marrs v. Oregon Short Line RR., 33 Idaho 785, 198 Pac. 468
(1921); Superior Laundry Co. v. Rose, 193 Ind. 138, 137 N.E. 761 (1923).
73The federal Fair Labor Standard Act § 16(b), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1958),
uses the same type of deterrent to encourage compliance with the federal minimum
wage and overtime pay requirements. The employer must pay the employee double
the amount of wages originally underpaid. Where the minimum wage or overtime
pay is involved the Fair Labor Standards Act supersedes the state penalties herein
discussed. Sirmon v. Cron & Gracey Drilling Corp., 44 F. Supp. 29 (D. La. 1942);
Divine v. Levy, 36 F. Supp. 55 (D. La. 1940).74 Supra note 72; compare the unconstitutional Texas statute supra note 72. The
Iowa statute has apparently been applied but once on the appellate level. Mitchell v.
Burwell, 110 Iowa 10, 81 N.W. 193 (1899). The case did not involve a challenge
to the constitutionality of the statute.
75 Supra note 72.76 Supra notes 72 and 70.
-
7 Indiana applies a penalty of $1 per day to employers in mining and manufacturing
and liquidated damages of 10% of the unpaid amount per day to all other employers.
South Carolina applies a penalty of continuing wages to both groups but cuts off the
penalty at thirty days for railroads, domestic labor, the lumber, logging and turpentine
industries, telephone and telegraph companies and oyster canneries. For all other
employers the penalty continues until the wages are paid.
7 8 District of Columbia, supra note 71; Montana, supra note 72.
7 9 District of Columbia, supra note 71; Kansas, supra note 72; Montana, supra note
72; Nevada, supra note 72.80 Minnesota, supra note 71; New Hampshire, supra note 71 (but only if less than
five are employed); New Mexico, supra note 70; Wisconsin, supra note 72.81 New Hampshire, supra note 71; New Mexico, supra note 70; Wisconsin, supra
note 72.
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pitals and sanitoriums, 2 logging operators, 3 employers in bankruptcy
or receivership, 4 and employers subject to the federal Railway Labor
Act.85
The statutes use several methods of defining the amount of the pen-
alty. Most commonly the penalty accrues at a rate equal to the em-
ployee's regular wage until the overdue wages are paid.86 The majority
of such statutes cut off the penalty wage at thirty days even if the over-
due wage has not been paid by then." Other cut-off points are sixty,88
fifteen,89 and ten days.9" Louisiana, New Mexico and, in some cases,
South Carolina, set no upper limit on the penalty." Other penalty de-
terminations are based on a percentage of the overdue wages which
accrues daily until the wages are paid. Three states penalize ten per
cent of the unpaid wage per day until the amount owing is either paid
or doubled." Kansas penalizes five per cent per month until paid, with
no upper limit.9" Oklahoma's rate is ten per cent per year until paid or
doubled.94 Colorado and Montana use a flat five per cent of the overdue
wages95 and Pennsylvania uses six per cent or $200, whichever is
greater.9" Indiana" and Iowa98 have a rate of one dollar per day until
paid or doubled. Wisconsin uses a sliding percentage scale with a fifty
dollar maximum and also limits eligibility for the penalty by excluding
employees who are paid a salary of more than $350 per month.9
82 Wisconsin, supra note 72.
83 Ibid.
84 Minnesota, supra note 71.
85 District of Columbia supra note 71.
86 Arkansas, supra note 70; California, supra note 71; Idaho, supra note 70; Illinois,
supra note 71; Louisiana, supra note 71; Minnesota, supra note 71; Missouri, supra
note 70; Nevada, supra note 72; New Mexico, supra note 70; Oregon, supra note 71;
South Carolina, supra note 70; West Virginia, supra note 70.
87 California, supra note 71; Idaho, supra note 70; Nevada, supra note 72; Oregon,
supra note 71; West Virginia, supra note 70; see also South Carolina, supra note 77.
88 Arkansas, supra note 70; Missouri, supra note 70.
89 Minnesota, supra note 71.
90 Illinois, supra note 71.
91 Louisiana, supra note 71; New Mexico, supra note 70; South Carolina, supra
note 77.
92 District of Columbia, supra note 71; Indiana, supra note 72; New Hampshire,
supra note 71.
93 Supra note 72.
94 Supra note 71.
95 Supra note 72.
96 Ibid.
9T Supra note 72. See also note 77 supra.
98 Supra note 72.
99 Supra note 72. On the sliding scale the penalty equals 10% of the overdue wage
if the delay does not exceed three days, 20% for a delay not in excess of 10 days,
30% up to 20 days, 40% for 30 days and 50% for any greater delay, but in no case
may the penalty exceed $50.
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The cases arising under such statutes uniformly hold that a tender
of the amount of wages originally overdue stops further accrual of the
penalty and that a tender of the penalty thus far accrued is not neces-
sary."' The majority of the cases hold that the employee may waive
his right to the penalty.'' There is a split as to the effect of an assign-
ment by the employee of his claim to the penalty. 02
The effectiveness of any type of deterrent is difficult to evaluate.
There will always be some who believe there is more to be gained by
risking the sanctions of the law. It would seem that the deterrent aspect
of this type of legislation would be less effective than the bonding ap-
proach in an individual industry, but the penalty-type laws do have
the advantage of being susceptible of general application to all em-
ployers. Another plus factor for the penalty-type law is that in addi-
tion to its deterrent effect it provides a needed remedy for delinquency
in the payment of wages.' If wages are not paid on time, the employee
is suddenly deprived of income on which he had relied for the payment
of his monthly bills. The consequences may range from the exhaustion
of savings to bankruptcy of the employee. At common law such dam-
ages are not recoverable unless they were reasonably foreseeable by
the employer at the time the employment contract was entered.'0 The
civil penalty or liquidated damage provision would appear to be an
effective solution. This type of legislation is compatible with the bond-
ing approach and both could be used effectively in combination. 5
-0 St. Louis I. M. & S.R.R. v. Bryant 92 Ark. 425, 122 S.W. 996 (1909); Oppen-
heimer v. Sun Kist Growers Inc., 153 Cal.App. 2d 897, 315 P.2d 116 (1957) ; Lindsey
v. McCatron, 78 Idaho 211, 299 P.2d 496 (1956); Hazel v. Robinson & Young, 187
La. 51, 174 So. 105 (1937).
101St Louis I.M. & S.R.R. v. Broomfield, 83 Ark. 288, 104 S.W. 133 (1907);
Home Equipment Co. v. Gorham, 218 Ind. 454, 33 N.E.2d 99 (1941); Mitchell v.
Certified Finance, Inc., 183 Kan. 787, 332 P2d 516 (1958) ; Monterosso v. St. Louis
Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 368 S.W. 2d 481 (Mo. 1963), cert. denied 375 U.S.
908. Accord, D.C. CODE §§ 36-601 to -610 (1961). Contra, Cato v. Grendel Cotton
Mills, 132 S.C. 454, 129 S.E. 203 (1925).
102 That an assignee may recover the penalty: Martin v. Going, 57 Cal.App. 631,
207 Pac. 935 (1922); Mitchell v. Burwell, 110 Iowa 10, 81 N.W. 193 (1899); (but
the penalty stops accruing as of the assignment). That an assignee may not recover
the penalty: Robinson v. St Maries Lbr. Co., 34 Idaho 707, 204 Pac. 671 (1921);
Chicago & S.E. Ry. v. Glover, 159 Ind. 166, 62 N.E. 11 (1901).
1o3 Washington presently provides liquidated damages of $25 plus $10 to $25 attor-
ney's fee, but only after a suit brought to enforce a purported "payment" of wages
by "check, memorandum, token or evidence of indebtedness" The statute was enacted
in 1888 and reflects the dollar values of seventy-six years ago. REv. CODE WASH. §
49.48.030 (1962). The only statutorily fixed time for payment of wages is that a dis-
charged employee must be paid "forthwith." REv. CODE WASH. § 49.48.010 (1962).
04 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1358, at 3810, § 1359, at 3816 (rev. ed. 1937);
McConaucx, DAMAGES § 138 (1935); 25 C.J.S. Damages § 24 (1941).
1o5 Indiana, supra notes 27 and 72; Montana, supra notes 27 and 72.
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LABOR LIENS
These statutes will not be considered in detail since the general
scheme of operation of such liens is well known. Labor liens may be
created for the employees in any industry which the legislature deems
to be in need of the protection. Perhaps the most common is the
mechanics' lien discussed earlier."' Other representative labor liens,
using Washington as an example, are the farm laborers' lien, °7 the tim-
ber and lumber workers' lien,0 8 the hotel and restaurant workers'
lien,1"' and the stevedores' and longshoremen's lien."0 Other states
may choose to protect different industries.
Such liens usually have a priority over other statutory or consensual
liens only if the work was commenced before the other lien attached."'
However, the statute may dictate that the labor lien is prior to all other
liens, no matter when acquired." 2
Making the lien prior to all other liens gives the employee maximum
protection in state proceedings, but the protection may be completely
or partially swept away in the case of the employer's bankruptcy. The
lien is preserved in full effect only if it is against real property" 3 or on
personal property which the lienor has in his posession at the time the
bankruptcy petition is filed." 4 If the lien is accompanied by levy,
sequestration or distraint but not by possession, the lien is subordinated
to the expenses of administration and wage priorities in bankruptcy".5
and is subjected to the same time and dollar limits as the wage prior-
ity."' In this situation the employee is in a better position if he waives
his lien."7 If there is neither possession nor levy, sequestration or dis-
106 See text following note 54 supra.
107 REv. CODE WASH. §§ 60.12.010 -.090, 60.16.010 -.030 (1962).
108 REv. CODE WASH. §§ 60.24.010 -.200 (1962).
109 REV. CODE WASH. §§ 60.34.010 -.050 (1962).
110 REv. CODE WASH. §§ 60.36.030 -.050 (1962).
111 E.g., REv. CODE WASH. § 60.04.050 (1962) (mechanics' lien on real property);
REV. CODE WASH. § 60.08.030 (1962) (mechanics' lien on personal property) ; REv.
CODE WASH. § 60.34.010 (1962) (hotel and restaurant workers' lien).
112 E.g., REv. CODE WASH. § 60.12.030 (1962) (farm laborers' lien); REv. CODE
WASH. § 60.24.038 (1962) (timber and lumber workers' lien).
3.1134 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 67.20, at 190, 195 (14th ed. 1962).
114 Bankruptcy Act § 67(c), 11 U.S.C. 107(c) (1953) ; 4 COLLIER, op. cit. supra
note 113, § 67.20 at 190, 195. Apparently an officer taking possession under legal
process is an agent of the lienor for this purpose. 4 COLLIER, op. cit. .rupra note 113,
§ 67.20, at 195, 196.
116 Bankruptcy Act § 67(c) (1), 11 U.S.C. 107(c) (1) (1953); 4 COLLIER, op. Cit.
supra note 113, § 67.20, at 190.
116 Bankruptcy Act § 67(c) (1), 11 U.S.C. 107(c) (1) (1953); 4 COLLIER, op. cit.
supra note 113, § 67.20, at 194.
117 There appears to be no case deciding whether an employee, if his claim is for
more than $600, can collect once under the § 64(a) priority and again under a sub-
ordinated lien. The author of 4 COLLIER, op. cit. supra, note 113, § 67.28, at 307 n.15,
expresses the opinion that the legislative policy of § 67(c) would limit recovery to $600.
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traint, the lien is invalid as to personal property.11 Thus in the case of
the employer's bankruptcy, the labor lien is fully effective only against
realty and against personalty in the lienor's possession. Even if the
state statute gives the employee a lien against real property, in the
usual bankruptcy situation the lien would be subordinate to one or more
mortgages or judgment liens. Also, although an independent contractor
may take possession of a chattel in order to work on it, such is rarely
the case with an employee. It is also unlikely that in the usual case
there would be enough time between the non-payment of wages and the
filing of the bankruptcy petition for the employee to distrain against
the personal property of the employer.
The labor lien will therefore be generally effective only if it is against
the real property of the employer and if the state statute gives the lien
priority over all competing liens. Although such statutes exist 19 they
provide a rather drastic remedy as far as prior mortgagees are con-
cerned. 2 An approach which in some degree would alleviate the hard-
ship to the mortgagee, yet preserve an effective remedy for the em-
ployee would be to extend the optional bond concept of the mechanics'
lien statutes 2' to other labor liens and give the labor lien priority over
all competing liens. This would give the employee the protection of
either a bond or a first lien against the employer's real property at the
election of the employer and his mortgagees.'
STOCKHOLDER LIABILITY LAWS
Laws making shareholders of a corporation secondarily liable for
wages of the corporation's employees are found in six states: Massa-
118 Bankruptcy Act § 67(c) (2), 11 U.S.C. 107(c) (2) ; 4 CoLiER, op. cit. supra
note 113, § 67.20 at 195.
119 E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 44-5.1 (1950), and Nay. Corn,. LAws § 78.720
(1953) create a lien for two months wages if the employer has become insolvent.
120 The problem is one of legislative policy. Which is the greater loss to the people
of the state, the loss of capital by the investor or the loss of earned wages by the
employee?
121 See text accompanying note 57 supra. A similar situation exists in the case of
railroads in Washington. If the railroad fails to take a bond from its construction
contractors, the railroad is subject to a lien for the wages of the contractor's em-
ployees. Rxv. CODE WAsH. § 60.32.010 (1962). Although the statute states that "no
mortgage, deed of trust or conveyance shall defeat or take precedence over said lien,"
the cases have reached the opposite result. Fitch v. Applegate, 24 Wash. 25, 64 Pac. 147
(1901) ; Heal v. Evans Creek Coal & Coke Co., 71 Wash. 225, 128 Pac. 211 (1912);
Seattle Ass'n of Credit Men v. Boersema, 8 Wn2d 263, 111 P2d 991 (1941).
122 However, the statute would be ineffective if the employer is a lessee of the
business premises or if the Bankruptcy Act should be amended to remove the distinc-
tion betveen realty and personalty. The distinction has been criticized and amendment
to eliminate it recommended. Kennedy, Statutory Liens in Bankruptcy, 39 MINN. L.
REm. 697 (1955) ; 4 CoI.I., op. cit. supra note 113, § 6720, at 191-193.
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chusetts, 23 Michigan,"2 4 New York,' Pennsylvania'28, Tennessee"2 7
and Wisconsin.' Although this group..9 is comparatively small, it con-
tains some of the nation's most commercially important states.
Stockholder liability for corporate debts is the exception rather than
the rule;... however, this exemption from liability is a comparatively
modern invention. The first breakthrough did not come until 1811
when New York exempted stockholders of manufacturing corporations
from general liability.' California and Minnesota were the last states
to abolish general stockholder liability and they did not do so until
1931 "' The stockholder wage liability statutes appear to be a holdover
from a previous era rather than the product of modern legislative
efforts.'
In three of these states2 4 the liability of the shareholder is limited to
an amount equal to the par value of his stock, or if the stock has no par
value, to an amount equal to the consideration he paid for his shares.
The other three states have no upper limit. Massachusetts and Wis-
consin limit recovery to six month's wages2 . and New York limits
123 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156, §§ 35, 38, 40 (1959). MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 158, § 45 (1959).
124 MICH. CONS?. art. 12, § 4; MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 450.30, 620.13 (1948).
125 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 630. The statute became effective in 1963, replacing a
prior stockholder wage liability law, N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 71.
126 PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-514 (1958).
127 TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-710 (1964).
1 2 8 WIs. STAT. ANN. § 180.40(6) (1957).
129 Until 1947 Oklahoma belonged to the group. OKLA. COMP. STAT. § 5463 (1921),
repealed by Okla. Laws 1947, p. 115, § 84, now codified as OKLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 18,
§ 1.84 (1953).
1 3oGenerally stockholders are liable only for any unpaid consideration owing on
the purchase of their shares. 1 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 23, par. 1 (1960).
131 Comment, Stock Without Par Value, 19 MICH. L. REV. 583 (1921).
132 Cal. Stats. 1931, ch. 862, p. 1784, § 2; Minn. Sess. Laws 1931, ch. 210, p. 234;
13A FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 6224 (rev. ed. 1961) ; 1 MODEL Bus. CORP.
ACT. ANN. § 23, par. 4 (1960).
133 Massachusetts supra note 123, enacted in 1821 ; Michigan supra note 124, enacted
in 1850; New York supra note 125, original statute enacted in 1848; Pennsylvania
supra note 126, enacted in 1874; Tennessee supra note 127, earliest case in 1880; Wis-
consin supra note 128, earliest case in 1873. The amendment of the earlier New York
law, N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 71, is the product of public clamor which resulted
from a 1952 suit for $130,000 in fringe benefits against the donee holder of a $10
non-voting share. The new act represents a compromise between business interests
who wanted complete abolition of liability and labor interests who wanted to retain
the old law intact. The new law limits liability to the ten largest shareholders of
corporations whose shares are not traded on a national exchange. It also provides
a ninety-day statute of limitations instead of the prior thirty days. Hoffman, The
Status of Shareholders and Directors under New York's Business Corporation Law:
A Comparative View, 11 BUFFALO L. REV. 496, 543-546 (1962).
'3M4 MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. cl. 156, § 40 (1959); Pennsylvania, supra note 126;
Bush v. Eastern Uniform Co., 356 Pa. 298, 51 A.2d 731 (1947) ; Wisconsin, supra note
128; Parish v. Awschu Properties, Inc., 243 Wis. 269, 10 N.W2d 166 (1943).
13 MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156, § 35 (1959); Wisconsin, supra note 128;
Kreuzer v. Gallagher, 229 Wis. 273, 282 N.W. 22 (1938); Sleeper v. Goodwin, 67
Wis. 577, 31 N.W. 335 (1887).
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liability to the ten largest shareholders of the corporation and then only
if the stock is not traded on a national exchange. 3' Only Massa-
chusetts applies its wage liability law to stockholders of foreign cor-
porations."r
The prerequisites to recovery from the shareholders vary signi-
ficantly. Massachusetts requires an adjudication of bankruptcy.'38
Michigan requires either the return of execution unsatisfied against the
corporation or an adjudication in bankruptcy. 3 ' New York's statute
requires written notice to the stockholder within ninety days of the
termination of service and that suit be commenced within ninety days
of the return of an unsatisfied execution on a judgment. 4 In Penn-
sylvania the plaintiff may join both the shareholder and the corpora-
tion as defendants but execution on the judgment must first be levied
against the corporation.'" The Tennessee statute requires only the
corporation's insolvency, 42 but an early case holds that the exhaustion
of the corporate assets is required 43 The Wisconsin statute makes no
explicit provision, but cases have allowed suit against the stockholder
where the corporation was in equity receivership'" and where it had
assigned its assets for the benefit of creditors.'45
Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, and Pennsylvania expressly
provide any shareholder found liable with a right of contribution from
other shareholders. 4 The Tennessee and Wisconsin statutes are silent
on contribution but the Wisconsin court has held that equities between
13o Supra note 125. See also note 133 suprm
'37 MASs. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 181, § 14 (1955). New York, under its earlier
statute, and Pennsylvania have by judicial decision declined to apply their laws to
foreign corporations. Arenwald v. Douglas Machinery Co., 183 Misc. 627, 50
N.Y.S2d 39 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Armstrong v. Dyer, 268 N.Y. 671, 198 N.E. 551 (1935);
Reiter v. Castle Foundry Co., 103 THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Philadelphia, Pa.) 181
(July 31, 1940), 1 LAwRENcE COUNTY L.J. 91 (Ct. Com. Pls. 1940). The constitu-
tionality of the application to foreign corporations was upheld in two cases testing
the old California law, supra note 132 and accompanying text. Thomas v. Matthiessen,
232 U.S. 221 (1914) ; Pinney v. Nelson, 183 U.S. 144 (1901).
138 MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 156, § 38 (1959).
's 9 MicH. Comp. LAws § 620.13 (1948). Cf., Knapp v. Palmer, 324 Mich. 694, 37
N.W2d 679 (1949).
140 Supra note 125. See also note 133 supra.
14, Supra note 126. Eiffert v. Pennsylvania Central Brewing Co., 141 Pa. Super.
543, 15 A.2d 723 (1940) ; McDowell v. C.H. Boley Co., 34 Pa. D.&C. 307 (1938).
"2 Supra note 127.
.43 Jackson v. Meek, 87 Tenn. 69, 9 S.W. 225 (1888).
244 Kreuzer v. Gallagher, 229 Wis. 273, 282 N.W. 22 (1938).
'45 Sleeper v. Goodwin, 67 Wis. 577, 31 N.W. 335 (1887).
348 Massachusetts, supra note 135; Cary v. Holmes, 82 Mass. (16 Gray) 127 (1860);
MICH. Comp. LAws § 450.30 (1948) ; New York, supra note 125; Pennsylvania, supra
note 126.
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stockholders must be adjudicated in the original action brought by the
employee."
Although these statutes provide the employee with an effective rem-
edy, the cost would seem to be too high. Not only is it possible that such
statutes would discourage investment in corporate enterprises, there is
some evidence that they tend to encourage incorporation outside the
state."' Such a statute would require a constitutional amendment in
the state of Washington.149
THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION IN WASHINGTON...
In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1963, 16,302 business bankruptcies
were filed in the United States.'5 ' This constitutes an increase of 4.1
per cent over the previous year."2 In the fiscal 1963 there were 496
voluntary bankruptcy petitions filed by businesses in the state of Wash-
ington.' Of these, eighty-nine were merchants, twenty-seven were
farmers, twenty were professionals, ten were manufacturers and the re-
maining 350 were engaged in other businesses.'54 How many dollars in
wages were lost from these 496 bankruptcies it is impractical to de-
termine, but to that sum must be added wages uncollectible in receiver-
ships and assignments for the benefit of creditors.'55
The four types of legislation which have been herein considered are
essentially only four different means of distributing the losses caused
by business insolvencies.
The asset distribution presently existing under the Bankruptcy Act
has been discussed; but to summarize in terms of loss distribution, the
147 Foster v. Posson, 105 Wis. 99, 81 N.W. 123 (1899).
148 Hoffman, supra note 133.
149 "Each stockholder in all incorporated companies, except corporations organized
f or banking or insurance purposes, shall be liable for the debts of the corporation to
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greatest loss, as measured by the percentage of the debt owed by the
insolvent business, is suffered by general creditors who in most cases
would be other businesses, such as suppliers, wholesalers, and public
utility companies. The next largest loss is by governmental units in
the form of uncollectible taxes. On the next notch up the ladder are
the employees of the business, and on the top rung are the secured
creditors, generally the banks and finance companies and in some cases
landlords, mechanics and materialmen. Of the losers in these four cate-
gories, most can redistribute part of their losses and general creditors
can often deduct their losses for income tax purposes while this is un-
available to an employee.15 Governmental bodies can allow for such
losses in determining the business tax and thereby spread their losses
among the businesses in the state, who in turn make allowances in
fixing their prices, further spreading the original loss among the state's
consumers. Banks and finance companies account for such losses in
setting their interest rates, spreading their losses among businesses and
ultimately among the consumers. The general creditors can for the
most part also spread the ultimate burden for loss among the general
population. But there is no one to whom the employee can pass on his
losses. In addition he has lost his source of income-his job. The
question for the legislature is whether this loss should also be spread
among a larger segment of our society.
Bonding laws place the initial loss on bonding companies, and from
there it spreads to other businesses in the forms of bond premiums and
then to the general population. The deterrent effect of the civil penalty
laws is to encourage the financially pressed employer to pay wages
instead of other creditors. Labor liens are paid at the expense of gen-
eral creditors and, in some cases, secured creditors. As mentioned,
these creditors can for the most part pass on some of their losses. On
the other hand, stockholder liability laws appear to only shift the loss
from the employees to the stockholders. This may or may not involve a
spreading of the loss depending upon the relative size of the two groups,
but it would be a rare case when the spreading would be over as broad a
segment of the population as is accomplished by the other laws, for the
stockholder, like the employee, will in most cases have no one to whom
he can redistribute his loss. D. MCKAY SNOW
3 56 INT. Rv. CODE § 166.
1965]
